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“The Ignorant Schoolmaster: 
knowledge and authority
Yves Citton
Few endeavours could appear more self- contradictory (and self- 
defeating) than an attempt to explain the argument developed by 
Jacques Rancière in his 1987 book The Ignorant Schoolmaster (subtitled 
Five Lessons on Intellectual Emancipation, English translation 1991). 
The main assertion repeated in this remarkably subtle praise of equality 
is that the most perverse form of oppression and subjection is located in 
the very act of explaining. Most of us tend to take for granted that giving 
explanations – and what is teaching but “giving explanations”? – is a 
noble act of generosity and emancipation through which the explainer 
raises the explainee to a higher level of knowledge and understanding. 
I have spent a good amount of time reading, analyzing, discussing and 
teaching The Ignorant Schoolmaster over the last decades; I am eager 
to help more people discover and enjoy its power and its beauty. I hear 
people say that Rancière is not an easy philosopher to understand, 
and that his theory of emancipation is not an easy argument to grasp; 
therefore I am about to explain the main notions, assumptions and 
consequences of this book, as well as its charms and its stakes. But 
since the main lesson of the book is that explanation runs contrary to 
emancipation, I – along with my fellow contributors to a volume dedi-
cated to “explaining” Rancière’s key concepts – seem bound to betray 
the author and his ideas by the very nature of our explanatory gesture.
The paradox goes further. The anti- explanatory message advocated 
by The Ignorant Schoolmaster is carried out through the explanation of 
someone else’s theories: Rancière has recovered the writings of a certain 
Joseph Jacotot (who first discovered that explanation runs contrary to 
emancipation), and he explains what Jacotot wrote in his theoretical 
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works. A closer look, however, will reveal that, rather than “explain-
ing” Jacotot’s theory, Rancière rewrites it. This chapter may therefore 
not be so self- contradictory (nor self- defeating) in its attempt to rewrite 
Rancière’s rewriting of Jacotot.
Joseph Jacotot’s reversal of the explanatory model
While presenting Rancière as a philosopher is not inappropriate (for 
he is a great inventor of concepts), it tends nevertheless to downplay 
two essential features of his interventions in the philosophical field: 
their frailty and their literariness. In this regard, none of his books is 
more tentative than The Ignorant Schoolmaster: it is experimental (it 
resembles a thought- experiment), provisional (it sketches a theory still 
awaiting its full development), conceptually fragile, and argumenta-
tively problematic (it thrives on a paradox). While Rancière has written 
a great deal about literature during his later career, rarely has he been 
as literary as in this early book, which takes the form of a narrative (the 
narrative of “an intellectual adventure”) as much as that of a philosophi-
cal argument. Let us first survey its plot, centred on its protagonist, 
Joseph Jacotot.
Once upon a time, there was a teacher (who had previously been a 
soldier, an administrator and a deputy) who was exiled from France 
after the Restoration of Monarchy in 1815, and who became a lecturer 
in French literature at the University of Louvain in the Netherlands. 
Faced with students who did not speak French, and unable to speak 
Flemish himself, Jacotot came up with a practical fix: he handed his 
students a bilingual version of Fénelon’s masterpiece Télémaque (one 
of the most widely read and admired didactic novels of the eighteenth 
century), and told them to learn French by figuring out this text in its 
original language with the help of the Flemish translation. This practical 
fix was the start of a philosophical experiment leading to an intellectual 
revolution: to Jacotot’s surprise, the students soon managed – so we are 
told at least – to master enough of Fénelon’s language to write essays 
(in French) about the book, achieving a very decent level of written 
expression. On the foundation provided by the fact that his students 
had managed to learn French without any form of explanation, Jaco-
tot started building a radical reformation of all pedagogical methods 
under the title of “Universal Teaching” [Enseignement universel], later 
renamed “the panecastic system”.
Such a reformation had a premise: every human being must necessar-
ily be capable of learning by himself (through trial and error, guesses and 
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self- correction), since this is how all of us learned our mother tongue. 
And since this is how we learned our first language, why could we 
not learn a second language in the same way? Beyond languages, why 
couldn’t we learn piano or painting in the same fashion? Or mathemat-
ics, or chemistry, or economics?
It also had a far- reaching implication: the teacher’s main function is 
not to transmit content (to give his knowledge to the ignorant pupils), 
but to drive the students’ will. Indeed, the figure of the teacher was 
not to be dispensed with along this path of reformation: Jacotot was 
instrumental in the process that led this group of students to learn a 
language they did not originally know. However, the part he played in 
the process was not the one typically defined by the Old Testament of 
pedagogical theory, which Jacotot and Rancière simply refer to as “the 
Old Master” (or rather, in the French original, as “the Old Lady”: la 
Vieille). In Jacotot’s practice, the teacher’s role was limited to influenc-
ing the will, and did not include any actual transfer of knowledge. His 
pedagogical act was not an explication (of the rules of French gram-
mar), but a series of commands: “Read this book! Pay attention to these 
words!” If the Good News brought to mankind by the apostle Jacotot 
was that every child of man is intelligent enough to learn anything 
without the help of an explicator, the reformed Gospel of Universal 
Teaching was not meant to put all teachers out of a job: it tended only 
to recast them as Commanders instead of Explainers.
This implication, however, had a surprising but important corol-
lary. Since a teacher did not need to (be able to) explain the content of 
the course, the teacher did not need to know nor understand what he 
was teaching. After having “taught” French (which he knew), Jacotot 
decided to teach piano or chemistry (in which he had no competence 
whatsoever). And it worked – or so we are told. A perfectly ignorant 
schoolmaster can teach a discipline that he has not mastered himself, 
since his role in the educational process is not to provide any specific 
content, but mainly to mobilize the learners’ will. Hence the disturbing 
reversal of values suggested by Rancière’s title. Far from naming and 
denouncing the disgrace of an impostor, The Ignorant Schoolmaster 
soon rings as a promise: there may be a blessed day of Intellectual 
Emancipation when “ignorant” people will be recognized as perfectly 
qualified schoolmasters; a day when children of human beings will have 
realized that they are intelligent enough to learn by themselves, without 
the need for any (superior) explicator, only with the commanding help 
(and encouragement) of their ignorant brothers.
A second, and even more disturbing, corollary followed: if the act 
of explication was in no way necessary to ensure proper learning, it did 
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nevertheless fulfil a very important function in the process of sociali-
zation, by teaching the students that they were ignorant, incapable of 
escaping ignorance by their own means. For here is Jacotot’s (and Ran-
cière’s) most subversive assertion: the true (if unconscious) function of 
all the generous, altruistic, philanthropic, enlightened and enlightening 
providers of explications is to instil a sense of inequality deep into the 
minds and souls of all the children of the Republic. These children all 
had the original experience of learning (their mother tongue, as well as 
most “life lessons”) by themselves. They all spontaneously acted upon 
that premise of an equality of intelligence (according to which all of 
us are able to figure out, by trial and error, what we need to know in 
order to master the codes that surround and structure us). In light of 
this original experience, the School (the educational system, the Old 
Master, la Vieille, with its pedagogical practices and its armies of well- 
meaning Teachers, Instructors, Masters and Professors) appears as a 
tremendous machine devoted to neutralizing that spontaneous power 
to learn by oneself. The true (if untold) content of the teacher’s explica-
tion has nothing to do with French grammar, fingering techniques on 
the piano or molecular interactions in chemistry: it is a monotonous 
chorus repeating, class after class: “You do not know how to learn”, 
“You need me, ie. my (superior) explications, in order properly to learn 
what you are learning”. Against the practical evidence of the equality of 
all intelligences, as demonstrated by the mastery of our mother tongue, 
the very structure of the (modern) School, with its emphasis on the act 
of explaining, works as the most powerful machine of indoctrination 
geared towards convincing us of the incapacity (you cannot learn by 
yourself) and inequality (some are knowledgeable, others are ignorant) 
of our intelligence.
Jacotot’s reversal of the explanatory model thus leads to a drastic 
and highly discomforting indictment of the progressive educator’s best 
intents: far from promoting equality by raising the (formerly) ignorant 
pupil to the higher status of an enabled knower, the act of transmit-
ting knowledge through explication tends to generate and perpetu-
ate a structure of inequality between the explainer and the explainee. 
Far from being reduced by the act of explanation, this structure of 
inequality is (re- )enforced each time the educator reasserts his superi-
ority by performing as a knowledge- provider. Far from contributing 
to the pupil’s emancipation, the explanatory model is to be seen as a 
dramatic source of “stultification” (abrutissement). Jacotot’s argument, 
closely followed by Rancière’s rewriting, precisely defines stultification 
as inherent to any relation in which “one intelligence is subordinated to 
another”, while, on the contrary, the possibility of emancipation rests 
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on maintaining a clear difference between the equality of intelligence 
and the possible subordination of the will. In Jacotot’s Universal Teach-
ing, “the act of an intelligence obey[s] only itself, while the will obeys 
another will” (IS 13).
From a pedagogical experiment to its political implications
Beyond the special case of classroom interactions and of teachers’ 
explications, The Ignorant Schoolmaster contains in a nutshell one of 
Rancière’s most fundamental and obstinate political assertions – the 
definition of politics as the verification of the presupposition of the 
equality of intelligence. The political implications of Jacotot’s gesture 
can be traced on at least three levels.
First, they lead us to question the political uses of expertise. Since 
Plato’s Republic (a constant punch ball in Rancière’s political reflection), 
“those who know” (theologians, philosophers, economists, and all of 
their fellow- experts) have claimed the right to be invested with politi-
cal authority in the name of their superior knowledge. The division of 
labour delineated by Socrates as illustrating the essence of justice in the 
macroscopic case of the City demanded that each individual remain in 
the place and function attributed to him by an optimal distribution of 
specialized skills: those who are best suited for making bread should 
be (and remain) bakers, those best at fighting should be (and remain) 
soldiers, and those best at understanding how the world goes should 
advise the kings (or become kings themselves) (Republic 433a–444a). It 
seems common sense to admit that we would be best governed if “those 
who know” were put in the position of being those who decide – just 
as it seems commonsensical to recognize that the explicator performs a 
generous act of equalization when he raises his listener to a higher level 
of understanding by transmitting his knowledge. Yet it is against this 
misleadingly self- evident equation between authority and knowledge 
that Rancière constructed the core of his political reflection.
In showing that the explainer tends to stultify the explainee due to 
the structural inequality of the explanatory model, Jacotot helps us 
see that the expert tends to kill the democratic process because of the 
very position from which he pretends to enlighten it. No matter how 
well intended or knowledgeable he may be in his disciplinary field, the 
expert represents a potential threat to democratic politics in so far as 
his very enunciation divides the citizenry in two: those who have the 
knowledge (and who are entitled to command), and those who lack the 
knowledge (and must therefore obey). Throughout most of his books, 
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Rancière has constantly denounced not, of course, “those who have 
knowledge”, but those who let their expert knowledge become a tool 
for silencing the claims and resistance expressed by “the ignorant ones”. 
In symmetrical contradiction to Plato’s philosophy, Rancière repeats, 
book after book, that the endlessly subversive nature of democracy con-
sists in accepting that “the ignorant ones” should be entitled to rule the 
City. His close reading of Jacotot revealed that “the ignorant person” is 
never defined as such by a mere lack of knowledge, but by an oppres-
sive structure that transforms a perfectly able intellectual agent into a 
powerless recipient (supposed passively to absorb forms of knowledge 
produced for him, but never by him) – an oppressive structure that is 
perverse enough to masquerade its very production of “the ignorant 
person” as a remedy against ignorance! “What stultifies the common 
people is not the lack of instruction, but the belief in the inferiority of 
their intelligence” (IS 39). The first political lesson to be drawn from 
Jacotot thus consists in spotting the stultifying side- effects that never 
fail to accompany any discourse of expertise, in so far as it is in the 
nature of explication and expertise to produce the very inequality of 
knowledge and power it pretends to correct.
The second political implication of Rancière’s reading of Jacotot 
can be encapsulated in a term that has become trendy (in France) only 
several years after the publication of The Ignorant Schoolmaster, a term 
that Rancière has never really appropriated for himself but that never-
theless synthesizes a fundamental dimension of his thinking: empow-
erment. While the stultifying explicator pretends generously to give 
something that is lacking in “the ignorant person” (knowledge, under-
standing), the empowering emancipator mainly purports to reveal a 
power (to understand) that is already present in the agent – even though 
it may not be accessible to him without the mediation of the emanci-
pator. The problem, in education, is not to transmit knowledge: “the 
problem is to reveal an intelligence to itself ” (IS: 28). Jacotot’s pupils 
had it within themselves to learn (Fénelon’s French) by themselves: the 
schoolteacher only provided an opportunity (a context, a situation, a 
framing structure) through which their power to learn found the chance 
to be actualized.
In this radical conception, empowerment consists not in a trans-
mission of power (which would imply and would in fact produce an 
inequality of status between the giver and the receiver), but in the 
realization–actualization of a power whose source is located within the 
agent himself. All human children have the power to learn their mother 
tongue (and any other language) without the assistance of an explicator. 
The intervention of such an explicator, far from helping them to learn, 
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“teaches” them that they are incapable of learning by themselves (it 
“stultifies” them; it constitutes them as “ignorant”). The emancipator’s 
role, therefore, does not consist in providing the agents with anything 
they lack (knowledge, understanding, intelligence, power), but simply 
in helping them remove the obstacles that separate them from their 
own power. Emancipation, as we already saw, concerns the will (rather 
than knowledge or intelligence). Its main message fits perfectly with the 
motto of empowerment politics: You already have the power; all you 
need is the will to use it for your own (common) good.
Slogans modelled on the “Yes, you can!” pattern can be both eman-
cipatory and oppressive. Their empowering nature is often counter-
balanced by an ideology of free will and unconditioned choice, which 
tends to blame the victims’ fate on their lack of “will power”, rather 
than on the situation that conditioned their choices. Few situations can 
be escaped by the mere will to just do it! “Universal teaching is not the 
key to success granted to the enterprising who explore the prodigious 
powers of the will. Nothing could be more opposed to the thought of 
emancipation than that advertising slogan” (IS 56). Politics, as Rancière 
defines it, consists in producing or in exploiting the practical conditions 
(context, situation, structural framework) that will solicit the agent’s 
will to use the power at his disposal. When Rancière presents politics 
as a process of subjectification, he undermines in advance any appeal to 
a will that would be unconditioned, that is “free” to have “just done” 
something if only the agent had made “the right choice”. His historical 
research in the nineteenth- century archives of the labour movement as 
well as in Jacotot’s pedagogical enterprise describe and analyse socio- 
historical conditions that have allowed for a process of emancipatory 
subjectification to take place (i.e. for a certain type of will to be pro-
duced within a certain type of collective structure).
Hence the third main political lesson to be drawn from The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster: because it consists mainly in processes of subjectifica-
tion, democratic politics revolves around the practical verification of 
the presupposition of the equality of intelligence. Since this principle is 
located at the very core of Jacques Rancière’s philosophy, its complex 
articulation needs to be spelled out with some care and patience, in at 
least five different steps.
 (a) The basic assertion is a “principle of equality of all speaking 
beings” (IS 39): “everyone is of equal intelligence” (IS 101). If 
one can define “man as a will served by an intelligence” (IS 51), 
one should immediately add that, although there may be “inequal-
ity in the manifestations of intelligence … there is no hierarchy of 
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intellectual capacity” (IS 27). All of Rancière’s writings amount 
to a persistent and deepening reflection on equality in general, 
political equality in particular, with the principle of equality of 
intelligence as its foundation – a foundation drawn from his study 
of Jacotot’s intellectual adventure.
 (b) The equality of intelligence, however, can never be observed as 
such. “We can never say: all intelligence is equal” (IS 46): phrenol-
ogists, neurobiologists, schoolmasters and other IQ- test designers 
will always find ways to measure something resembling intellectual 
capacity, and to rank the manifestations of intelligence accord-
ing to the particular scale they happen to promote. This may be 
the reason why most progressive political agendas have tended 
to present equality as a goal (generally a never- fully achievable 
goal) for the future, rather than as a premise on which to build an 
egalitarian society.
 (c) This postponement of equality into a never- fully- achievable future 
constitutes the main trap of progressive politics Rancière has con-
stantly denounced throughout his writings. Jacotot’s (anti- )model 
of the explicator offers the blueprint for all such postponers of 
equality. Their common motto is: Accept to submit your (lower) 
intelligence to my (higher) understanding today, in order to be 
my equal tomorrow! Because it is based upon the principle of 
inequality of intelligence, this falsely emancipating (but actually 
stultifying) attitude, which has permeated most forms of modern 
progressive politics, defeats its stated purpose by relying on (and 
by perpetuating) the very inequality it pretends to abolish.
 (d) Since the equality of intelligence cannot be observed as such in its 
given manifestations, nor postponed as a goal only to be attained in 
the future, it has to be considered as a premise to egalitarian poli-
tics, a premise that needs to operate as a presupposition. Equality 
is “not an end to attain, but a point of departure, a supposition to 
maintain in every circumstance” (IS 138). The only truly eman-
cipatory processes of subjectification that took place in modern 
history have received their dynamics from such a presupposition 
of equality of intelligence. Their slogans have been structured in 
the form of a “Yes, we already can”, rather than as a “One day we 
will be able to”. Their power has relied on the intuition that “We 
can” because we, as speaking beings, must declare and consider 
ourselves equal in intelligence to those deemed superior. This, in 
turn, has resulted from a self- declaration that has the form of a 
presupposition rooted in the will, rather than of an objective form 
of knowledge based on the collection of positive evidence.
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 (e) Democratic politics will therefore consist in the practical veri-
fication of such a presupposition. “Equality is not a given, nor 
is it claimed; it is practiced, it is verified”; it will “never exist 
except in its verification and at the price of being verified always 
and everywhere” (IS 137–8). Since the equality of intelligence 
cannot be observed in its given manifestations, “we are reduced 
to multiplying the experiments inspired by that opinion” (IS 46). 
However, the self- emancipating agents might say, “our problem 
isn’t proving that all intelligence is equal. It is seeing what can be 
done under that supposition” (ibid.). The presupposition has no 
worth in itself: its value is strictly limited to its effects, that is, to 
the practical experimentations produced by its attempted verifi-
cations. Contrary to the explicator’s postponing device, the very 
structure of such verifications actually implements the equality 
they aim to foster: “for the only verified intelligence is the one 
that speaks to a fellow- man capable of verifying the equality of 
their intelligence” (IS 39).
Jacotot’s practical experimentations (and theoretical reflections) in 
the field of pedagogy thus provided Rancière with a neat and original 
definition of democratic politics: to qualify as democratic, political 
agency must set in motion or fuel a practical verification of the equal-
ity of intelligence, that is, a process of subjectification through which 
all participating agents are empowered to find out for themselves how 
their conditions of living can be improved. By contrast, this definition 
raises suspicion towards the best- intentioned efforts through which 
progressively minded intellectuals (or parties) “explain” to the masses 
what is in their best interest from a superior position of expertise or 
scientificity.
As Kristin Ross skilfully showed in the introduction to her English 
translation of The Ignorant Schoolmaster (IS IX–XII), the book used 
Jacotot indirectly but sharply to criticize scientist attitudes that domi-
nated a large spectrum of the French intelligentsia, from the remaining 
followers of Louis Althusser and Pierre Bourdieu to the neo- positivism 
of (ex)- socialists converted to the laws of free- market capitalism (on the 
contrasts and parallels between Rancière and Bourdieu, see Nordmann 
2007 and Pelletier 2009a and b). Rancière’s intervention contributed to 
introducing a wedge within the left field of modern politics. From the 
early Enlighteners plotting the education of the masses, to the Marx-
ist philosophers denouncing the illusions of “ideology” in the name 
of materialist “science”, and all the way to the late twentieth- century 
sociologists theorizing the necessary “ignorance” of the social agent, 
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all political projects explicitly geared towards the ideal of equality had 
to be reassessed in the new light shed by the long- forgotten Universal 
Teaching promoted in the 1820s by Joseph Jacotot. And, under this 
discriminating light, many emancipatory projects appear betrayed by 
large segments of an
intellectual heirarchy that has no other power except the ration-
alization of inequality. Progressivism is the modern form of that 
power, purified of any mixture with the material forms of tradi-
tional authority: progressive have no power other than that ing-
norance, that incapacity of the people on which their priesthood 
is based. How, without opening up an abyss under their own feet, 
can they say to working people that they don’t need them in order 
to be free men, in order to be educated in everything suitable to 
their dignity as men? (IS 129)
From the contradictions of the explicator to the 
paradox of the spectator
If Rancière managed to operate such a theoretical tour de force in 
exhuming Jacotot’s obscure writings, it is largely due to the literary 
devices he crafted to compose The Ignorant Schoolmaster. As Kristin 
Ross also notes, the reader of this highly sympathetic narrative of Jaco-
tot’s life and legend can hardly distinguish the moments when Rancière 
speaks for himself from the pages where he merely lends his voice to 
his protagonist (IS XXII). His most daring assertions are often prudently 
hidden behind the outrageous statements of the pedagogue; in return, 
tongue- in- cheek irony towards the provocative lunacy of the school-
master’s claims pushes the reader to imagine Rancière himself smiling 
at the disturbingly radical and deliciously counter- intuitive positions 
he is led to defend in his effort to give an advantageous account of 
the doctrine of Universal Teaching. Far from trying to assess the “true 
value” (and limits) of Jacotot’s theses, far from raising the numerous 
objections that jump to mind in the face of his declarations, Rancière 
adopts the posture of a humble advocate, espousing their logic as closely 
as possible, defending them as his own – even (or rather especially) in 
their most extreme and outrageous implications.
Such literary devices provide the narrow door that allows Rancière to 
escape what initially appeared to be a constitutive contradiction of his 
book: the account he provides of Jacotot’s anti- explanatory system is 
in no way “an explication” of Jacotot’s writings. Even though he often 
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situates Jacotot within the intellectual debates of the early nineteenth 
century (bringing in quotes from Bonald, Maine de Biran, Destutt de 
Tracy, Lamennais), Rancière never attempts to second- guess Jacotot in 
“explaining” his behaviour and his assertions in causal terms, from a 
position of superiority towards the text. His presentation of Univer-
sal Teaching does not “explain” the doctrine, but merely rewrites it 
(by editing it, reassembling it, summarizing it, paraphrasing it) into a 
language that makes sense at the turn of the twenty- first century. Or 
rather, Rancière’s gesture consists in translating Jacotot’s writings into 
the vocabulary and framing of our own current problems and debates 
(with Althusser, Bourdieu, the economists and other advocates of politi-
cal expertise). In doing so, The Ignorant Schoolmaster provides the 
most convincing example of an interpretation that endows an old book 
simultaneously with a renewal, a presentification and an actualization 
(Citton 2007).
Far from betraying the anti- explicator’s message by an explication of 
his doctrine, Rancière remains deeply true to the founding experience 
on which Jacotot built his Universal Teaching. For the first success of 
the “panecastic system” consisted in a process of translation that took 
place between the Flemish pupils and Fénelon’s French novel. As we 
recall, “everything had perforce been played out between the intel-
ligence of Fénelon who had wanted to make a particular use of the 
French language, the intelligence of the translator who had wanted to 
give a Flemish equivalent, and the intelligence of the apprentices who 
wanted to learn French” (IS 9). In his gesture of situating himself on 
the same level (of advocacy) as Jacotot and of merging his translating 
voice into that of the nineteenth- century author, Rancière enacts one of 
the most important panecastic lessons, which therefore applies equally 
well to his relation to us as it applies to Jacotot’s relation to his pupils:
without thinking about it, he had made them discover this thing 
that he discovered with them: that all sentences, and consequently 
all the intelligences that produce them, are of the same nature. 
Understanding is never more than translating, that IS: giving the 
equivalent of a text, but in no way its reason. There is nothing 
behind the written page, no false bottom that necessitates the 
work of an other intelligence, that of the explicator; no language 
of the master, no language of the language whose words and 
sentences are able to speak the reason of the words and sen-
tences of a text. The Flemish students had furnished the proof: 
to speak about Télémaque, they had at their disposition only 
the words of Télémaque. Fénelon’s sentences alone are necessary 
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to understand Fénelon’s sentences and to express what one has 
understood about them. Learning and understanding are two 
ways of expressing the same act of translation. (IS 9)
Such an act of translation – in its etymological sense of “displace-
ment” – has been pursued by Rancière long after the publication of 
The Ignorant Schoolmaster. Not only did he devote the two following 
decades to deepening and sharpening his reflection on the politics of 
equality, but he recently returned to the lessons of intellectual eman-
cipation sketched by Jacotot in order to redefine the relation between 
politics and the arts in his 2008 book, The Emancipated Spectator 
(English translation 2009). In this case, the displacement consisted in 
applying to the spectator and to the aesthetic experience provided in 
a theatre, a cinema, a museum, or at home in front of a television, the 
same presupposition of the equality of intelligence applied by Jacotot 
to his pupils in his Louvain classroom. The result of this further act of 
translation overturns two premises that are almost universally accepted 
in the current reflection on contemporary art. In reference to Denis 
Diderot’s famous 1778 text entitled The Paradox of the Comedian, Ran-
cière wrote The Paradox of the Spectator in order to debunk a double 
indictment frequently addressed to the traditional role of the audience.
First, as long as he sits in the darkness, watching the performance 
presented on the stage, the spectator is conceived as a passive being, 
whom countless scenographic devices, throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, have desperately tried to “activate” (by blurring “the fourth wall” 
separating the stage from the audience, by exposing or unsettling him, 
by performing obscene acts supposed to raise his indignation, his out-
rage or any other form of (re)active participation). Secondly, all of the 
most significant currents in modern art, from Berthold Brecht and 
Antonin Artaud to the many reincarnations of agit- prop and “hap-
penings”, have attempted to pull the spectator out of his position of a 
watcher, who would return to his normal (and “real”) life after the brief 
parenthesis of an entertaining or thought- provoking show, in order 
to push him to become a doer, most frequently a revolutionary agent 
geared up to take over the local Winter Palace.
On these two basic points, Rancière goes back to the lessons he drew 
from Jacotot in order to propose two drastic reversals. He first invites 
us to recognize in the spectator the same active power of intelligence 
that Jacotot revealed in his pupils: watching a show is in itself a form of 
(interpretive) activity, which triggers countless operations of attention, 
selection, retention, anticipation, retrospection, translation, adaptation 
and so on. He then suggests that a good number of modern artists (and 
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art theorists) have indeed put themselves in the highly questionable 
position of the Explicator (i.e. of the Stultifier) by the very gesture 
through which they pretended to play the role of Emancipator. Many 
forms of “revolutionary” art – if not most of them – have treated their 
spectator with the type of condescendence Jacotot denounced in the 
explanatory system of la Vieille. Not only did the much- reviled apolo-
gists of Socialist Realism (in its multiple avatars) pretend to “explain” 
to the people what it ought to understand in Art and in Society, but the 
avant garde itself, because of the very wedge it introduced between the 
enlightened appreciators and the “ignorant” masses, ended up portray-
ing the vast majority of the spectators as passive and powerless fools, 
endlessly numbed by the “Society of the Spectacle”. Such attitudes 
reproduced the stultifying division between those who have Knowledge 
and Authority (in the arts) and those who lack the power to understand 
and make proper (aesthetic) judgements.
Presupposing the equality of intelligence, in this particular case, leads 
us to presuppose an intelligence at work in each spectator: the types, 
levels, intensities, qualities, and therefore the value of the operations 
generated by an aesthetic experience can obviously vary widely from 
the most conventional soap opera to the most transgressive theatre 
performance, but a truly emancipatory conception of the arts must rec-
ognize in each spectator of any genre of show an active translator who 
can – and more importantly still, who does – find for herself a mean-
ingful and self- creative appropriation of the material presented to her.
“Understanding is never more than translating, that is: giving the 
equivalent of a text”: understanding a work of art, understanding a 
book, understanding The Ignorant Schoolmaster, does not consist in 
explaining it from a position of superior knowledge and authority, but 
in translating it, in appropriating it within an activity of (self- as well 
as social) transformation that constantly rewrites the book according 
to the ever- changing demands of new situations. It could be said that 
Rancière has constantly rewritten Jacotot’s tale and legend in his later 
publications on politics and aesthetics. It is up to our equally intelligent 
(though ever biased) readings to constantly rewrite his books according 
to our current needs and desires for emancipation.
